Annotated Text
1. "So far, the offensive[e449] is progressing[e2] with dramatic
success," said[e4] a buoyant Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander
of U.S. forces.
2. Similarly, while cautioning[e6] about the
uncertainty[e531] of early battle[e450] reports[e7], White House spokesman
Marlin Fitzwater said[e8] late yesterday[t451] that "the operation[e9] has been very successful."
3. Amid reports[e10] that thousands of Iraqi
soldiers had surrendered[e11], administration aides were also
upbeat in private, with one even talking[e12] of victory[e13] within a
week.
4. But even continued[e14] military success carries[e16] political and
diplomatic risks[e17] for President Bush and the U.S. The allied
rejection[e18] of the last-minute Soviet-led diplomatic effort[e19] to avoid[e21] the ground war[e22] enabled[e23] Mr. Bush to seize[e25] the initiative
from an Iraq seemingly bent on dictating[e452] peace terms.
5. But it
has offended[e28] some, especially in Arab countries, who now believe[e29] that Mr. Bush's real objectives[e454] are the demise[e453] of
Saddam Hussein and the destruction[e30] of the Iraqi military, not
just the liberation[e31] of Kuwait.
6. "Why have a war[e32]?" asked[e33] Abdul Latif Shekar, a customs
officer in Egypt, a country participating[e34] in the attack[e35] on
Iraqi troops.
7. "I think[e37] the Gorbachev plan was a good[e535] one.
8. Iraq was ready to withdraw[e39]."
9. Now, he says[e40], "it looks[e41] like the
West just wants[e42] to destroy[e44] Iraq."
10. Despite the early indications[e45] of success, the allied
forces could still suffer[e47] greater casualties[e455] and become[e526]
bogged[e456] down militarily , especially when they encounter[e52] the
tough Republican Guard, which is entrenched[e53] along the
Iraq-Kuwait border.
11. If so, and if it appears[e55] that the
American goal[e56] actually is to destroy[e58] the Iraqi regime[e457] even at
the cost of badly hurting[e60] Iraqi society, "the lingering cost
of that could be high," worries[e458] former national security
adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.
12. But, he notes[e62], "If everything
crumbles[e459] totally, that won't be such a problem."
13. American officials staunchly disavow[e64] any interest in
driving[e66] through Iraq toward Baghdad, either in pursuit[e67] of
Saddam Hussein himself or to set[e69] up some American-controlled
government inside Iraq.
14. The Americans say[e70] their battle plans
call[e71] for operating[e72] against forces inside Iraq as far north as
the city of Basra, about 30 miles north of Kuwait, but say[e73]
there is n't any plan[e462] to drive[e76] beyond that.
15. Indeed, French President Francois Mitterrand said[e77]
yesterday[t463] that some allied forces are crossing[e78] Iraqi
territory as part of a "pincer" movement[e79] to trap[e466] the soldiers
occupying[e80] Kuwait, but insisted[e81], "The purpose[e468] isn't to invade[e82]
Iraqi territory, that's not the aim[e470], that isn't the mandate[e83]."
16. Nevertheless, American officials over the weekend[t472] became[e84]
more open[e473] in declaring[e86] that by destroying[e87] Saddam Hussein's
military machine they hope[e88] to destroy[e90] his regime[e474] -- a goal[e91]
likely to be supported[e93] by most Americans.
17. In a pre-attack message[e94], Lt. Gen. Walter Boomer, the top
Marine in the Persian Gulf, told[e95] U.S. Marines that their goal[e96]
is to " restore[e98] {Kuwait} to its citizens."
18. He went[e99] on to add[e102]
that "in so doing[e104] you not only return[e105] a nation to its people,
but you will destroy[e106] the war machine of a ruthless dictator."
19. Secretary of State James Baker said[e107] on ABC-TV's "This Week
With David Brinkley" that the series of United Nations
resolutions[e477] condemning[e478] Iraq's invasion[e110] of Kuwait "imply[e111] that
the restoration[e112] of peace[e479] and stability[e480] in the Gulf would be a
heck of a lot easier[e532] if he and that leadership[e116] were not in
power in Iraq."
20. Of course, it is still far too early[e536] to assume[e120] that the
military situation[e482] on the ground will stay[e122] as smooth for
allied forces as it appears[e124] to have been so far.
21. Iraq still
has[e127] the potential to cause[e129] significant problems[e485] by using[e130]
forces and weapons that don't yet seem[e132] fully engaged[e133].
22. For one thing, Iraq still apparently has n't unleashed[e135] its
stockpile of chemical weapons.
23. Gen. Schwarzkopf said[e138] that
some early reports[e139] that chemical weapons were used[e141] against
allied troops turned[e142] out to be "bogus."
24. Iraq is believed[e144] to have[e146] the ability to deliver[e148] chemical weapons in artillery
shells or, perhaps, atop Soviet-made Frog7 missiles.
25. Perhaps more important, it appears[e150] that allied troops
have n't yet fully engaged[e151] Iraq's vaunted Republican Guard,
which has been sitting[e487] just north of the Iraq-Kuwait border
and is considered[e154] the most potent element in the Iraqi
defense[e155].
26. It remains[e157] to be seen[e159] how much damage[e160] the allied air
campaign[e161] was able[e488] to inflict[e163] on the Guard, and whether
President Hussein will commit[e164] his most valued troops to a
fight-to-the-death finish[e165].
27. Certainly Saddam Hussein continues[e166] to implore[e168] his country
to fight[e169] on.
28. "Fight[e170] them," he urged[e171] Iraqis in a radio
address[e173].
29. "All Iraqis, fight[e174] them with all the power you have[e175],
and all struggle[e176] for everything."
30. American war planners have long assumed[e180] that the early
stage of the ground attack[e181], in which American forces would use[e182] their speed to sweep[e185] around Iraqi defenses and their
strength to punch[e188] through the relatively weak Iraqi front
line, would be the easiest[e537] part.
31. Despite these early successes, the mere fact that a ground
campaign[e194] has begun[e195] almost guarantees[e196] that the Bush
administration will face[e527] fresh problems[e490] growing[e197] out of the
military situation[e491].
32. There are likely to be additional
American prisoners of war taken, and there are signs[e201] that
President Hussein is taking[e202] Kuwaiti hostages.
33. U.S. and
Kuwaiti officials say[e203] there are reports[e204] that large numbers of
civilians from Kuwait City are being rounded[e492] up and held[e207] by
Iraqi troops, apparently either for use[e208] as human shields or
for use[e209] later in bargaining[e210] once the war[e211] is over.
34. President Bush's political argument[e212] for going[e213] to a ground
war[e214] has been strengthened[e215] by the growing stream of reports[e216] of
wanton Iraqi destruction[e217] inside Kuwait.
35. U.S. officials say[e218]
that hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells now may have been set[e219] afire[e493].
36. And Robert Gates, Mr. Bush's deputy national security
adviser, asserted[e221] in an interview[e222] on the Cable News Network
that Iraqi troops have set[e224] fire[e225] to "large sections" of Kuwait
City.
37. Mr. Bush and his aides were leaning[e227] toward a military
conclusion[e528] of the crisis[e228] even before the latest reports[e229] of
Iraqi atrocities[e231] in Kuwait came[e232] to light.
38. The president and
his top aides tentatively decided[e235] on Feb. 11[t494] that a ground
war[e236] would be necessary[e538].
39. The decision[e238] was made[e239] after Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, returned[e240] from a visit[e241] with military
commanders in Saudi Arabia, administration officials say[e243].
40. Then, a week or so ago[t496], Gen. Schwarzkopf secretly picked[e244]
Saturday night[t498] as the optimal time to start[e247] the offensive[e248].
41. The date[t499] was unaffected[e500] by the last-ditch Soviet peace
initiative[e249].
42. The real problem[e501] with the Soviet proposals[e250], U.S.
officials now say[e251], was that they all would have required[e252]
lifting[e254] economic sanctions[e255] against Iraq.
43. The Bush
administration considers[e256] the sanctions[e257] essential to keeping[e258]
Saddam Hussein under control[e502] should he survive[e259] the war[e260].
44. Mr. Bush forestalled[e261] further diplomatic maneuvering[e504] by
issuing[e262] an ultimatum[e263] on behalf of the allies demanding[e266] that
Iraq withdraw[e267] within a week[t505], starting[e268] at noon Saturday.[t507]
45. Administration aides said[e269] that the idea of the ultimatum[e270] was
Gen. Powell's.
46. He argued[e271] setting[e272] an explicit deadline for
Saddam Hussein to break[e274] would, when it was broken[e276], give[e277] the
U.S. military a clear green light to proceed[e279].
47. In setting[e280] out his final challenge[e281] to Saddam Hussein, Mr.
Bush continued[e282] the intensive personal diplomacy[e283] he began[e284]
after the invasion[e285] llast August[t508].
48. After cabling[e287] world leaders
about his intention[e509] to give[e289] Saddam Hussein a final deadline
to exit[e290] Kuwait, he offered[e291] him a week[t518] to withdraw[e293] fully , instead of the four days[t519] he originally considered[e294], because of
objections[e295] from some European partners that four days seemed[e296]
punitive and unrealistic.
49. And when he and President Gorbachev spoke[e298] about the
decision[e299] in a talk[e511] lasting nearly an hour[t520], the President took[e300]
pains to listen[e303] to what his counterpart had to say[e306], although
he already had decided[e307] that the Soviet alternative to the
allied deadline was unacceptable[e539].
50. Finally, when Iraq failed[e309] to respond[e311] to the U.S.
ultimatum[e529], Mr. Bush let[e312] the ground offensive[e513] begin[e313] as
previously planned[e314] Saturday night[t514].
51. The attack[e315] was lightning quick, as allied forces punched[e317]
through tall sand berms on the border and pushed[e318] forward into
Iraq and Kuwait.
52. U.S. Marines were said[e319] to have breached[e321]
troublesome mine fields along the Iraqi lines but Pentagon
officials said[e323] no amphibious assault[e324] on Kuwait's beaches had begun[e325].
53. Long columns of Iraqi prisoners of war could be seen[e327]
trudging[e329] through the desert toward the allied rear.
54. U.S.
commanders said[e331] 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were taken[e332] in the first
hours of the ground war[e334], though some military officials later said[e335] the total may have climbed[e336] above 8,000.
55. The U.S. hopes[e338] its troops will drive[e339] Iraqi forces out of
Kuwait quickly , leaving[e340] much of Iraq's offensive military
equipment destroyed[e341] or abandoned[e342] in Kuwait.
56. It expects[e343] that
tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers will surrender[e344] to the
U.S. and its allies over the the next few days.[t517]
57. If the allies succeed[e345], Saddam Hussein will have plunged[e346]
his country first into a fruitless eight-year[t521]-long war[e347]
against Iran and then into a humiliating war[e349] against the U.S.
and the allies to defend[e352] his conquest[e353] of Kuwait, leaving[e354] much
of his country's military establishment[e355] and modern
infrastructure in ruins.
58. Meanwhile, the U.S. hopes[e356], economic sanctions[e357] and an
international arms embargo[e518] will remain[e358] in effect until Iraq
pays[e359] war reparations[e360] to Kuwait to cover[e362] war damages[e521].
59. That
would undermine[e363] any chances of rebuilding[e365] either Iraq or its
armed forces in short order as long as Saddam Hussein remains[e368]
in power.
60. The American hope is that someone from within Iraq,
perhaps from the army's professional ranks, will step forward
and push Saddam Hussein aside so that the country can begin
recovering from the disaster.
61. Outside analysts think Saddam Hussein's position is indeed
precarious.
62. "I think[e377] frankly Saddam is finished[e378], no matter
what happens[e380]," says[e381] Christine Helms, a Middle East scholar
who has written[e382] extensively about Iraq.
63. "These guys simply do n't retire[e383] to condos over the Euphrates."
64. Despite the lack of any obvious successors, the Iraqi
leader's internal power base appeared[e385] to be narrowing[e387] even
before the war[e388] began[e390].
65. Some analysts say[e391] he appeared[e392] to be relying[e394] on a smaller and smaller circle of close advisers and
relatives.
66. If that's true, the narrowing of his support[e397] would make[e398] it easier for someone to push[e401] him aside from within.
67. Yet, paradoxically, the perception that the U.S. wants[e402] to destroy[e404] Iraq may increase[e405] Saddam Hussein's support[e407] within the
Iraqi military.
68. And the U.S. now will face[e523] sharper questions
in the Arab world since it did n't back [e409] the peace proposals[e411]
worked out in Moscow.
69. "We looked[e413] to the United States, we
expected[e414] you to have[e416] the moral edge," says[e417] Nasser Tahboub, a
Jerusalem-born Jordanian who has[e418] an American wife and a
doctorate in political science from Duke University.
70. "Now we
see[e420] that edge eroded[e421].
71. For me, it is a great tragedy[e422].
72. For the
first time in history, the U.S. has gone[e424] to war[e425] with an Arab
and Muslim nation, and we know[e426] a peaceful solution[e427] was in
reach[e429]."
73. ---
Geraldine Brooks in Amman, Jordan, and Craig Forman in
Cairo, Egypt, contributed to this article.